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Abstract
The World Bank is the single largest source of development finance, with wide-
reaching influence. The Bank’s safeguards aim tominimize the negative impacts
of the projects it funds. These policies have recently been updated in a new Envi-
ronmental and Social Framework. For conservation, the key changes include a
mechanism for the use of biodiversity offsets and borrowers’ own frameworks
to manage impacts. Concerns have been raised that these changes may weaken
protections as there is substantial flexibility about when offsets or borrowers’
frameworks can be used, and uncertainty around the efficacy of offsets. The
project-by-project nature of these mechanisms and the lack of clear criteria may
also hinder future efforts to hold the Bank to account. Concerns about these
changes were raised by conservation organizations during the consultation pro-
cess, but the framework’s formulation does not fully reflect recommendations
made. Although elements of the new policy have the potential to benefit con-
servation, the flexibility presents a risk to biodiversity. It is vital for conservation
organizations to engage effectively to ensure that any negative impacts arising do
not go unchallenged.
KEYWORDS
biodiversity offsets, development impacts, environmental policy, environmental safeguards,
international governance
1 INTRODUCTION
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, and the International Development Association
(following convention hereafter referred to as “the World
Bank” or “the Bank”) are together the largest source of
development finance, distributing around $57 billion in
loans and grants annually (Rich, 2013). The World Bank is
distinct from thewiderWorld BankGroup, which includes
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.
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organizations such as the International Finance Corpo-
ration (hereafter “IFC”). The Bank funds activities, such
as infrastructure construction, that can negatively impact
biodiversity (Narain,Maron, Teo,Hussey, &Lechner, 2020;
Rich, 2013). The Bank has developed safeguard policies
that aim to minimize the negative impacts of the projects
it funds (Himberg, 2015). Safeguards were adopted by the
Bank in the early 1990s after successful campaigns by
civil society organizations convinced U.S. legislators to
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withhold funding unless reforms were implemented
(Wade, 1997). These safeguards were widely considered
thought-leading, comprehensive, and stringent and they
formed the basis of many other organizations’ policies
(Park, 2010), although controversy over the negative envi-
ronmental impacts of Bank funded projects remained
(Rich, 2013; Sommer, Shandra, & Restivo, 2017).
In October 2018, the Bank replaced the safeguards with
the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) (World
Bank, 2016). The ESF consolidates formally stand-alone
policies into a single framework. It sets out first a broad
vision statement, then requirements applying to the Bank,
and finally 10 Environmental and Social Standards (ESS)
imposing requirements on borrowers (World Bank, 2016).
The primary focus of the ESF is on improving borrowers’
experiences by, for example, improving the efficiency of
decision-making and streamlining processes (World Bank,
2010, 2012). This is framed as the Bank responding to
the preferences and needs of borrower countries and a
changing lending landscape (World Bank, 2012) including
the growth in alternative sources of financing (Bugalski,
2016). However, the ESF also recognizes the importance
of improving the environmental and social outcomes of
projects and expands the policy’s coverage by including
more types of risks and impacts (Himberg, 2015; World
Bank, 2012). This reflects the Bank’s “increased awareness
of the value and vulnerability of the global commons” (World
Bank, 2012), and may reflect the preferences of donor
governments and civil society organizations (Van Den
Meerssche, 2017).
Several of the changes in the ESF are of relevance to
biodiversity conservation. For example, it uses the lan-
guage of ecosystem services when discussing impacts and
it expands the habitat classifications, requiring considera-
tion of impacts in human “modified” habitats (the other
types being “natural” or “critical” habitats, any of which
may also be in the “legally protected and internationally
and regionally recognized areas of biodiversity value” cat-
egory, hereafter “protected”) (World Bank, 2016). How-
ever, the adoption of the ESF has led to concerns about
the weakening of protections and accountability by the
Bank (Bugalski, 2016; Van Den Meerssche, 2017; World
Bank, 2018c). The Bank’s lending portfolio and its influ-
ence on other organizations makes understanding these
changes important for biodiversity conservation. Here we
consider two changes that we think are most likely to
impact biodiversity conservation: biodiversity offsets and
the delegation to borrowers’ frameworks. Further, we dis-
cuss the implications of the ESF for the accountability of
the Bank.
2 BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS
The ESF commits borrowers to the aim of no net loss, and
preferably a net gain, in biodiversity for projects located
in natural, critical, and protected habitats (World Bank,
2016). It applies amitigation hierarchy, stipulating that bor-
rowers must first avoid, then minimize, then mitigate, and
finally offset the negative impacts of a project. In modi-
fied habitats there is no commitment to no net loss and
impacts need only be avoided, or minimized andmitigated
“as appropriate” (World Bank, 2016). For offsets to be used,
the area affected must not be “. . .unique and irreplaceable
from a biodiversity standpoint,” and all “technically and
financially feasible” prior steps in the mitigation hierarchy
must have been taken (World Bank, 2016). The adoption of
themitigationhierarchy, the prominence of offsets, and the
commitment to no net loss are all changes in policy from
the old safeguards.
The mitigation hierarchy has been proposed as an effec-
tive means of dealing with negative impacts to biodiversity
(Arlidge et al., 2018). No net loss policies and biodiversity
offsets are increasingly prominent globally (zu Ermgassen,
Utamiputri, Bennun, Edwards, & Bull, 2019) and the ESF
mirrors the policies of the IFC, the private-sector lending
arm of the World Bank Group, which are widely consid-
ered best practice (IFC, 2012; Narain et al., 2020). Biodiver-
sity offsets aim to bring benefits to biodiversity by coun-
terbalancing the losses from development; however, they
remain controversial (Benabou, 2014; Maron et al., 2016).
There is currently insufficient empirical evidence to deter-
mine whether or not offsets are effective in delivering the
required outcomes (zu Ermgassen et al., 2019). Their suc-
cess is likely heavily dependent on their design, such as
governance and funding arrangements, and local factors,
such as land availability and biodiversity trends (Maron
et al., 2016; Sonter et al., 2020). Even well-designed offsets
will likely entail some residual uncompensated negative
impacts (zu Ermgassen et al., 2019).
During consultation on the new policy, the inclusion
of the mitigation hierarchy was welcomed by some con-
servation organizations, but others argued that discre-
tionary and inconsistent language weakens the policy (see
Appendix S1: Table S1 for details). For example, ESS1
(“Assessment and Management of Environmental and
Social Risks and Impacts”) requires offsets only when they
are “technically and financially feasible” (World Bank,
2016a). This caveat is not repeated in ESS6 (“Biodiver-
sity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living
Natural Resources”), which requires offsets when resid-
ual impacts remain and “where appropriate,” (Table S1;
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World Bank, 2016a) and is weaker than the IFC’s equiva-
lent policy (Performance Standard 6, hereafter PS6) (IFC,
2012). Concerns were also raised that the lack of a require-
ment not to proceed if residual impacts cannot be offset
risks creating a perception that all risks can be managed
(Table S1). Three submissions also argued that the ESFwas
overreliant on offsetting, a controversial management tool
(Table S1).
The ESF has few restrictions on offsets’ use and design.
Instead decisions are made on a project-by-project basis by
a “qualified expert,” following “Good International Indus-
try Practice” (World Bank, 2016). Examples of good prac-
tice that could be followed are given in the policy’s guid-
ance notes (World Bank, 2018b), mirroring PS6 (IFC, 2012).
For critical habitats and any habitat in the protected cat-
egory, experts must be independent and internationally
recognized, but for other habitats they can be Bank staff
(World Bank, 2016) who may be incentivized to approve
projects whenever possible (Weaver, 2007), a potential con-
flict of interest. In PS6, experts for offsets must always be
external (IFC, 2012). Experts’ bias could be an issue even if
they are independent, as they may be reliant on Bank staff
for future work (Benabou, 2014).
The principle of additionality is key to offsetting, mean-
ing that the biodiversity gains must be directly caused by
the offset andwould not have happened anyway, otherwise
there is no net improvement in biodiversity (Maron et al.,
2016). The ESF states that an offset must be “designed and
implemented to achieve measurable, additional, and long-
term conservation outcomes” (World Bank, 2016). How-
ever, there are no specific protections against cost shift-
ing, a situation where offset funding replaces rather than
supplements national funding commitments for conser-
vation (IUCN, 2016; Ledec, Johnson, Lovei, Warner, &
Parker, 2016; Pilgrim&Bennun, 2014). Cost shifting under-
mines additionality and could lead to conservation becom-
ing dependent on money from offsets, creating a perverse
incentive for development to ensure protection (IUCN,
2016; Pilgrim & Bennun, 2014). This is a particular issue
given that the borrowers are national governments with
existing commitments to achieve conservation targets,
who therefore could use offset funding to achieve those
goals instead of undertaking new actions (Maron, Gordon,
Mackey, Possingham,&Watson, 2016). This problem could
be addressed with policy mechanisms (Maron et al., 2016)
but none are included within the ESF.
The ESF allows for offsetting to be used when projects
impact IUCN class I–IV protected areas (those with strict
protections). This is in conflict with the limits on offsetting
proposed by the IUCN’s guidance (IUCN, 2016). Permitting
offsetting on strict protected areas is recognized as a source
for concern by the Bank (Ledec et al., 2016), and was raised
during the consultation process (Table S1). Two arguments
may be made in support of offsetting in these contexts.
First, projects impacting protected areas are required to
be consistent with the legal protection status and govern-
ment recognized management plans (World Bank, 2016).
Second, development might be seen as inevitable, and it is
therefore better to have offsets than not (Ledec et al., 2016).
Offsetting of impacts to strict protected areas is recom-
mended by the relevant IUCN resolutions, however devel-
opment should be only permitted in these areas “in the
most exceptional circumstances where overwhelming pub-
lic interest (such as maintenance of traditional livelihoods)
requires it” (IUCN, 2008). Nevertheless, the uncertainty
about whether offsets are effective means that their use
in these highly sensitive and important areas represents
a significant risk and is a reasonable cause for concern
(Table S1). Furthermore, given the Bank’s wide-reaching
influence, by permitting offsetting in these areas, the ESF
could drive an increase in their use by legitimizing the
practice.
3 BORROWERS’ FRAMEWORKS
The ESF introduces a mechanism that allows borrowers to
use their own frameworks to assess and manage the envi-
ronmental and social impacts of a project (World Bank,
2016). Borrowers’ frameworks are described as the ele-
ments of a country’s laws, regulations, policies, and sys-
tems that are relevant to the risks and impacts of the project
(World Bank, 2016). The assessment of the adequacy of a
borrower’s framework is carried out on project-by-project
basis by Bank staff (World Bank, 2018a). If they determine
that a borrower’s framework is adequate the ESF does
not apply further (World Bank, 2016). This is a significant
shift from the existing policy where projects were assessed
against the requirements set out in the safeguards (Van
Den Meerssche, 2017).
During the consultation, submissions from individuals
representing borrowers welcomed the introduction of bor-
rowers’ frameworks (Table S1). However, others raised a
number of concerns (Table S1). For example, some ques-
tioned the capacity of borrowers to offer the same level
of rigorous assessment and monitoring (Table S1). The
strength of national policies dealing with impacts to biodi-
versity varies, many low-income countries, a focus of Bank
lending, havemuchweaker requirements as can be seen in
their limited uptake of no net loss policies (zu Ermgassen
et al., 2019). Four submissions, from a range of organiza-
tions, argued that the delegation of responsibility for envi-
ronmental and social standards was risky and therefore
should not be allowed for high-risk projects either indef-
initely or for an initial period after the ESF is adopted
(Table S1).
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To meet the standard required for delegation, the bor-
rower’s framework must be judged “likely to address all
relevant risks and impacts,” and must “enable the project
to achieve objectives materially consistent with the ESS”
(World Bank, 2016). However, despite calls during the con-
sultation for a clear definition and rigorous criteria for
assessing frameworks (Table S1), no definition of “materi-
ally consistent” is provided. Instead the Bank has argued
that what constitutes being “materially consistent [. . . ]
is context-specific,” and therefore a standard definition
cannot be given (World Bank, 2018c). Typically, projects
funded by the Bank have greater requirements for assess-
ment, consultation and compensation than those imple-
mented under national laws, so they are more costly and
take longer to be approved (Buntaine, 2016; World Bank,
2010). This creates a strong preference amongst borrow-
ers to use their own frameworks, but it also creates a con-
flict of interest for the Bank staff who are charged with
assessing the frameworks and are incentivized to approve
projects as part of their performance metrics (Weaver,
2007). These conditions risk encouraging staff to subvert
policies to speed up the approval processes (Rich, 2013), a
phenomenon that has previously been reported by Bank
staff in anonymous interviews (Buntaine, 2016). Indeed,
the problem of the Bank’s internal organizational culture
has been raised as a barrier to safeguard effectiveness (Bun-
taine, 2016; Rich, 2013; Weaver, 2007; World Bank, 2002),
but the ESF does not address this issue; rather it increases
the ability of Bank staff to exercise discretion (Passoni,
Rosenbaum, & Vermunt, 2016).
The ESF’s delegation criteria are less stringent than in
the piloting of borrowers’ frameworks, which required
“equivalence” with principles that matched the Bank’s
safeguards (Bugalski, 2016; World Bank, 2011). Although
that pilot recommend moving away from an equivalence
measure, it also concluded that clear assessment crite-
ria, communicated to all stakeholders and benchmarked
against existing international agreements, are vital (World
Bank, 2011). Calls for these kind of assessment criteria
were made during the consultation process (Table S1) but
are lacking in the ESF. Historically, the Bank has jus-
tified involvement in controversial projects on the basis
that it can improve standards through its policies (Rich,
2013; Wade, 1997). Although the ESF has mechanisms to
assist countries in strengthening their systems by includ-
ing training and capacity building as part of a project, this
is intended to achieve “material consistency” so the bor-
rower’s own framework can be used in the future (World
Bank, 2016). The ability of the Bank to improve standards
in development has therefore been diminished by the ESF
and the adoption of borrowers’ frameworks could ulti-
mately result in weaker standards.
4 HOLDING THE BANK TO ACCOUNT
A wider consequence of the adoption of the ESF may be
a reduction in the ability of civil society to hold the Bank
to account. The delegation mechanism within the ESF has
the potential to dilute the authority of the Inspection Panel
(the Bank’s independent grievance mechanism), making
legal proceedings against the Bank more difficult (Bugal-
ski, 2016; Van Den Meerssche, 2017). The lack of strict
requirements within the ESF and the use of project-by-
project agreements make it difficult to prove the Bank has
failed tomeet its obligations (Bugalski, 2016). It is no longer
sufficient to show that a project has failed to meet the
requirements of an element of Bank policy, and now com-
plainants would have to show that the project could never
have been expected to meet the policy’s standards in an
acceptable timeframe and manner (Van Den Meerssche,
2017). For the Bank to have met its requirements under the
ESF it need only demonstrate proficient assessment, which
could be argued even in caseswhere a project failed to com-
ply with all of the policy’s environmental standards (Van
Den Meerssche, 2017).
The Inspection Panel has historically used a standard
of reasonableness to judge if the Bank has met its duty of
care, regardless of the specific language in policies (Passoni
et al., 2016). Causal links between the Bank’s failure on due
diligence and the negative impact of a project caused by
a borrower’s actions have previously been identified (Pas-
soni et al., 2016). Therefore, if the Panel is allowed to con-
tinue as it has done before, delegation might not impede
accountability (Passoni et al., 2016). However in recent
years the Panel has been unwilling to launch formal inves-
tigations, giving Bankmanagement greater leeway (Bugal-
ski, 2016). Additionally, given the significant shift in policy,
Bank management and the board may look to reduce the
remit of the Panel when borrowers’ frameworks are used
(Passoni et al., 2016). In the absence of empirical evidence,
the ultimate impact of the ESF on accountability of the
Bank remains to be seen.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND
CONSERVATION’S RESPONSE
The ESF is a more comprehensive policy than the previous
safeguards, requiring consideration of a greater number of
impacts, but it is also a very flexible policy that focuses
on outcomes rather than strict requirements and allows
for project-by-project agreements. It represents a signifi-
cant shift in approach for the Bank. Elements of its pol-
icy mirror those widely accepted as current best practice
and its flexibility may be desirable for some stakeholders,
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particularly borrowers. However, it has also raised con-
cerns from several conservation organizations (Table S1).
The policy’s requirements for the use of biodiversity offsets
and delegation to borrowers’ frameworks have drawn criti-
cism for being vague and overly discretionary. If themitiga-
tion hierarchy is well-applied and no net loss achieved, and
if borrowers’ frameworks provide equivalent or better envi-
ronmental safeguards, then the broader scope of the ESF
could bring significant benefits for biodiversity. However,
without a sufficiently clear policy, these potential benefits
remain uncertain and there is a risk that they could result
in the Bank funding more projects that negatively impact
biodiversity.
The ESF also represents missed opportunities to
strengthen protections. In line with the previous policy,
the ESF only applies to investment projects and not
to Development Policy Lending (formally Structural
Adjustment Loans) which represent around half of
all Bank lending, and have historically had significant
environmental impacts (Sommer et al., 2017). A global
infrastructure boom is predicted in coming decades, with
initial evidence suggesting much of this infrastructure will
be constructed without strong environmental safeguards
(Narain et al., 2020; zu Ermgassen et al., 2019). Because
of this it is important, now more than ever, for publicly
funded institutions such as the World Bank to drive up
standards in development. Several elements in the ESF
are a positive contribution to this aim but others appear to
fall short.
What impact the ESF will actually have remains to be
seen, but several elements are a cause for concern for bio-
diversity. Looking forward, those stakeholders who share
these concerns need to continue to engage effectively with
the Bank, its donors and the recipients of its funds in order
to ensure that the highest standards of environmental pro-
tection are maintained in projects supported by the Bank.
Such engagement by civil society groups has previously
been a driving force of reform at the Bank. The project-
specific nature of the ESF will require project-specific
responses, led by the relevant local stakeholders, to ensure
that any harm caused does not go unchallenged.
To support these efforts, there is a need for interdisci-
plinary and transdisciplinary research that brings together
an understanding of the political and legal mechanisms
that can most effectively influence Bank stakeholders,
with new methods for identifying geographical areas of
concern, anticipating risks, and evaluating the impact
of development on conservation outcomes. By better
understanding these conflicting demands and oppor-
tunities, conservation organizations can improve their
ability to identify the most important risks and engage
constructively with the Bank’s stakeholders to achieve
positive outcomes for biodiversity and people.
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